Abstract-This paper studies how the communication network affects the power utilization and fairness in a simplified power system model, composed by three coupled layers: physical, communication and regulatory. Using an agent-based approach, we build a scenario where individuals may cooperate (by removing a load) or not (by keeping their loads or adding one more). The agent decision reflects its desire of maximizing the delivered power based on its internal state, its global state perception, a randomized selfishness related to its willingness to follow demand-side control requests, and the state information received from its neighbors in the communication network. Our focus is to understand how the network topology and errors in the communication layer affect the agents' behavior, reflected in the power utilization and fairness for different demand-side policies. Our results show that for optimal power utilization and fairness a global knowledge about the system is needed. We show that close to optimal results can be archived with either a demand control signal or a global pricing for energy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric power grids are experiencing a widespread of communication networks within their infrastructure realm, allowing for different applications for the end users [1] . This, however, increases their already complex characteristics. Hence proper models aiming at capturing new features that might emerge still need to be built [2] .
In a recent paper [3] , Bale et al. pointed out some limitations of the standard economic-optimizer models for energy systems while indicating the importance of complexity science models to better characterize them. We follow here this line of thought in order to provide a different approach for demand-side management in power grids [4] , [5] . Our focus is to use an agent-based simulator, recently proposed by the authors in [6] , to model the interrelations of multi-layer systems so as to understand how the dynamics of one layer affect, and are affected by, each other.
In this way, we expect to provide a different perspective on demand-side control policies beyond utility maximization by considering three different scenarios: no signaling, global signaling and pricing scheme. Specifically, our main contribution is to assess, in both micro and macro levels, how the agent decision dynamics are for different communication network topologies, link error probabilities and demand-side management policies.
To do so, we employ a multi-layer model built as follows. The physical layer is a circuit composed by a power source and resistors in parallel. Individual agents can add, remove or keep the resistors they have. Their decisions aiming at maximizing their own delivered power, which is a non-linear function dependent on the others' behavior, and they are based on (i) their internal state, (ii) their global state perception, (iii) the information received from their neighbors in the communication network, and (iv) a randomized selfishness related to their willingness of answering to a demand-side control request. By individually modifying the communication network topology, the link error probability and the demand-side management policies keeping fixed the other parameters, we expect to show how these factors affect the power utilization and fairness in the system for different number of agents.
When no demand-side control is considered, we show that: (i) different communication network topologies (ring, WattStrogatz-Graph and Barabasi-Albert-Graph) lead to different levels of power utilization and fairness at the physical layer and (ii) a certain level of error induces more cooperative behavior at the regulatory layer. On the other hand, if demandside control or pricing schemes are considered, the system behaves in a more predictable manner and is less dependent on its size. In this case, due to the global knowledge about the state of the system, it also enables much higher utilization and fairness.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section II describes the multi-layer model employed here. Section III presents the numerical results used to analyze the proposed scenario. In Section IV, we discuss the lessons learned from our model, indicating potential future works.
II. MULTI-LAYER MODEL
The basis of this article is a multi-layer model of the power grid and a communication system, which we will be briefly described in the following section. Our discrete-time, agentbased model assumes these three layers as constitutive parts of the system composed by an electric circuit as the physical infrastructure, a communication network where agents exchange local information and a set of regulations that define the agents' behavior, as exemplified in Fig. 1 .
A. Agents' decision process
As stated before the model assumes discrete time steps, denoted by t. Therefore the interactions between the agents might be viewed as a round-based game [7] . At each step in time t, every agent aims to maximize its own power.
To achieve this aim, the agent has three options: add a resistor (defecting), remove it (cooperating), or do nothing (ignoring). The decision is based on the gain from the previous strategy S i rt´1s in order to decide its new state S i rts in the following manner. If the gain λ i rt´1s is greater than or equal to a system-wide pre-defined minimum λ min , the agent continues to its (successful) strategy at time t, i.e. S i rts " S i rt´1s. Otherwise, if λ i rts ă λ min , then agent i compares its strategy with its neighborhood N i , which will be defined later in this section.
In the case that a majority of the neighborhood is cooperating, e.g. ř jPNi S j rt´1s ă 0, indicating that the system is in a bad condition, the agent will also switch to cooperate, leading to S i rts "´1. Otherwise, the agent draws a random number between 0 and 1 to be compared to its own selfishness gene s i in order to decide whether it will start cooperating or not. The selfishness is randomly distributed at the beginning of the simulation. In the case of not cooperating, another random number is drawn and compared to the selfishness gene s i , but now to decide if stays inactive (i.e. S i rts " 0) or adds another load in the circuit (i.e. S i rts "`1). The agent decision procedure is shown in Fig. 1 .
B. Communication network
The communication network enables agent i to know the state S j rt´1s of the agents j P N i which are in his neighborhood. We assume that agent j always transmits its actual state S j rts to agent i. However, the communication links can also experience errors. An error event means the received message by agent i contains a different information than agent j has sent. So that if S jÑi rt´1s " S j rt´1s is the state information send from j to i andŜ jÑi rt´1s be the information received by i.
We assume that error events are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) such that the probability of the event: Pr "Ŝ jÑi rt´1s ‰ S jÑi rt´1s ı " p err for all t P Z, i P A and j P N i The network is a bidirectional graph so that an error at i Ñ j does not imply an error at j Ñ i, and vice-versa. If an error happens, the received informationŜ jÑi rt´1s is assumed to be i.i.d. between the other possible states.
C. Physical system
In the physical systems as presented in Fig. 1 , there exists an optimal number of resistors that leads to the maximum power delivered from the source to the agents. If the delivered power is below the maximum on the right, then there will be a gain by removing a resistor until the system has reached such point. Conversely, if it is below on the left, then there will be a gain by adding a resistor.
One may ask the following question: Is it possible for the agents to reach the optimal point with limited knowledge about the system? In the presence of a central control unit this would be a fairly easy problem. First, we need to find the number of resistors that leads to optimal power to then distribute them among the agents. This kind of solution resembles time division schemes in computer networks or cellular systems [8] . However, as discussed before, in the absence of a centralized controlling entity, the agents only have a limited knowledge about other agents.
In any case, the agents also have some information about the state of the system from based on their own power consumption and the decision done. At time-step t, the power each agent consumes P i rts with i P A " t1, ..., N u and is given by:
where
, a i rts is the number of active resistors the agent i possesses, r i rts is the number of active resistors in the system excluding the source resistor R V and the ones controlled by agent i, and a avg rts " pa i rts`r i rtsq{N .
The physical system is then described by its size N , the ratio µ of the resistance values and the power source V . The resistors are scaled so that the optimal average number of resistors`aå vg˘i s independent of N while the voltage might be scaled with ? N to have a constant ratio of power per agent, as explained later on. The gain that agent i experiences at time-step t is then defined as:
This implies that the agents only use the information about the previous time-step t´1. If we expand (2) using (1), the resulting equation that determines λ i rts becomes more complicated. To make the analysis clearer, we choose to apply the following approximation:
such that the gain λ i rts is now a function of the variations in agent i's own number of resistors ∆a i rts " a i rts´a i rt´1s and in the number of resistors controlled by other agents ∆r i rts " r i rts´r i rt´1s, as well as the average number of resistors a avg rts and the system parameters N and µ.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. First we introduce the initial results introduced in [6] where neither demand-side management signaling nor more complex communication topologies are considered. Then, we present our new results indicating the effects of such factors on the system in comparison with our basic model. The agents are connected in a communication network so that a given agent has access to the information related to the previous action of their first-order neighbours. In the ring topology illustrated here, every agent is connected with two other agents. In this case agent i is connected with agents i´1 and i`1 with i " 1, 2, ..., N . In the ring topology, agents 1 and N are neighbours. (c) At time step t, the normalized power delivered P all rts{Ptyp to the agents with rising number of resistors nrts in the system, where Ptyp "
and P all rts " ř iPA P i rts with P i rts given by equation (1) . (d) The decision tree representing the decision making process of each agent for each round.
A. Baseline model
In Fig. 2 one can see the inherent dynamics of the system when no demand-side management is done and the communication network topology is a ring. We identify two phenomena that are important for our analysis, as explained next.
First, we see that the average number of cooperators varies with the size of the system, showing a very high number of cooperation for larger systems. However, as we will see later in Fig. 2 , this fact is not enough to tell the whole story. As we will see later, this high level of cooperation is not necessarily a universally good outcome.
The second phenomena we see is a change in behavior of the system for different sizes. While for small systems we see an almost checkerboard like distribution of white (cooperation) and black (defection) dots, mid-sized systems show a strikingly different image: we now see a sort of wavelike pattern where a large front of cooperations establishes and then suddenly brakes down. This is again in contrast to the picture for large systems where the behavior is dominated by cooperation with some sparsely distributed red dots.
The resulting changes in the power delivery can be seen in Fig. 3 , which shows that only very small systems of less then 10 agents are able to stay very close to the optimum, while systems of more then 10 agents start to deviate from it. These curves also reflect the wave-like behavior for midsized systems, where the number resistors drops due to almost global cooperation. This brings the system close to the optimal point, when the number of resistors rises once again. For large systems, the system does not get close to the optimum. However, it is more stable and predictable than the other cases.
The background of how this global behavior emerges from the local interactions shall not be part of this paper. A detailed analysis of those rather complex dynamical behaviors is found elsewhere [6] . In this paper, we will view this intrinsic unstable performance as a undesirable outcome.
In the next subsection, we will explore ways to prevent this behaviors by using demand-side signaling with different communication topologies. As we will see later, our goal is to provide a global indication via either direct signaling or pricing so the agents can use this information to make their individual decisions.
B. Effects of demand-side model
In Fig. 4 , we can see the results of a global signal that sent to all agents when the system is beyond the optimal point. This signal might be interpreted as a way to implement a demand response mechanism where the distribution operator experience a peak in consumption. From the agents' view, this signal provides a global information about the system so they do not have to rely only on their neighbors. This global information is assumed to be reliable and is treated in the same way as the neighbor information: if the signal is present and the agent experiences a small gain, it starts cooperating.
As we can see in Fig. 4 , the signal enables the system to reach the optimum point independent from its size. For comparison the original system is also shown where it is, on average not possible for any size to reach such high states of power utilization. We can also see that there is no big difference in the behavior for different network topologies.
Another option to stabilize the system would be to rely on pricing. For this purpose, we have to adapt our model. Instead of just maximizing its own power demand, the agents now have to maximize their utility taking the price into account.
The price function needs to reflect the state of the system as a signal of overuse (when necessary). In order to achieve build such a function, we first need to build an utility function that reflects how the power demand is valued. We adopted the following utility from [9] , [10] :
where P i being the power consumption while α and ω determine how consumption is valued.
The function is chosen so that there exists a linear marginal benefit up to a certain point, at which the benefit does not increase anymore with higher consumption. In our case, we keep α fixed at 0.2 while ω i is uniformly distributed between 2.05˘0.05, representing different values of consumers about the importance of power consumption.
The price function, meanwhile, is modeled as a simple step function:
assuming that p 1 " 0.2 and p 2 " 5.
The cost for each user is then calculated by multiplying the consumption with the current price:
The agent decision process itself is similar, but now, instead of optimizing the received power, the agents are now optimizing their benefit (the utility minus the cost):
The results using the proposed scheme can be viewed in Fig. 5 . Once again we can see overall the results are much better than the one presented in Section III-A. However, if we compare the case of a simple ring graph (brown curve) describing the neighborhood versus a more meshed topology from Watts-Strogatz graph (green), we see that the communication network (where local information about the neighbors are transmitted) has still a big influence on the final outcome. This effect seems to be more pronounced for small networks. However, mid-sized systems, which are the most critical size when no signaling is considered, still experience stable outcomes.
IV. DISCUSSION AND FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we have demonstrated that it is possible to counter act the very unpredictable behavior that arises in the model proposed in [6] when no global signaling is used. We analyzed here two strategies different strategies: one is the direct signal when the system is overusing state and the other is price.
The first strategy is a rather simple way of providing each agent with global information about the system. This strategy enables a more stable outcome, which is much less influenced by other parameters of the simulation, like the communication network topology.
The second strategy, in its turn, is to transform the original power optimization in to a cost-benefit optimization, where each agents aims to archive his personal optimal power usage considering price and utility value of the consumed power. While similar outputs could be demonstrated with this approach, it is necessary to point out that the choice of parameters to archive a stable outcome in the scenario is much more complicated.
In the none trivial case, where the sum of the demanded power of all agents exceeds the maximum available power, the outcome is highly dependent on the choice of not only the price levels but also the valuation of the power given by α and ω i . This fact suggests that real time pricing in combination with demand response, which is often proposed as way to utilize changes in available power, needs to be finely tuned in order to archive a stable outcome. In other words, pricing does not inherently guarantee optimal usage and stability. Rather the outcome of the first strategy indicates that a direct response to capacity constraints without the intermediate pricing layer is much easier to implement in a stable manner.
From these results, we plan to extend the present work by looking at the effects of the price parameters on the system dynamics. We also expect to build a signaling strategy that indicates different levels of power consumption in the netwo
